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I will jump straight to the second, bolder, task. (Let's start with a bang!) How can we show that scientific progress should not be 'defined by increasing verisimilitude'? We need only find a single case, hypothetical or actual, where the verisimilitude of scientific theories fails to increase, yet science nevertheless makes progress. Then we may conclude that increasing verisimilitude in the content of science is not necessary for, even if it turns out to be sufficient for, scientific progress.
I'll give such a hypothetical case in the next paragraph. But beforehand, I must prepare the ground by signaling my agreement with Niiniluoto (2011) on two matters.
First, the notion of scientific progress is normative: 'the theory of scientific progress is not merely a descriptive account of the patterns of developments that science has in fact followed. Rather, it should give a specification of the values or aims that can be used as the constitutive criteria for "good science".' Hence, '[t] he task of finding and defending such standards is a genuinely philosophical one which can be enlightened by history and sociology but which cannot be reduced to empirical studies of science.' (ibid.) Second, progress may be multi-faceted: 'Progress is a goal-relative concept.
But even when we consider science as a knowledge-seeking cognitive enterprise, there is no reason to assume that the goal of science is one-dimensional.' (ibid.) This is the case in Niiniluoto's own account, in so far as both truth and informativeness (or what Kuhn called 'scope') are significant. On a one-dimensional account focused on truth, by way of contrast, making modern science's claims closer to the truth by limiting its domain, e.g. by throwing out all scientific theories except those of biomechanics, could be progressive. Another response is to deny that the scenario in the thought experiment is possible.
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And the most natural way to do this, I think, is to suggest that any true general theory, in a given area, must also be maximally virtuous relative to possible alternatives, i.e. maximally simple, comprehensible, predictively useful, and so forth. 7 There is 5 See also the more detailed discussion in Rowbottom 2011b & 2011c.
6 I hold a non-factive account of understanding, on which the propositions expressing an understanding may not be true, in line with that presented by Elgin (2007) ; we will return to this issue subsequently. 7 Note that the 'possible alternatives' need not be general, or also have maximal scope; for example, there could be multiple alternatives with individually less scope, but jointly as much scope. Hence, it is not necessary to assume that there is more than one theory that saves all the phenomena in the domain. Moreover, there appears to be evidence from the history of science that T may be less virtuous than T * , in key respects, even when T is more verisimilar than T * . (That is, granting that the central theories in some domains have increased in verisimilitude.)
For example, the two-spheres model of the universe -where Earth is stationary at the centre, and the sphere of stars rotates around it -is much simpler and easier to use, for navigation at night on the sea, than any truer model that I am aware of. Similarly, it is much easier to make everyday predictions in mechanics by disregarding relativistic considerations -and even by positing non-existent forces, such as the centrifugal,
Euler, and Coriolis forces -than it is to take them into account. So why should we expect such results not to occur in the special case where T happens to be true, as well as more verisimilar than T * ? Why not say as follows? Truth is sometimes strangermore complex, more unaccommodating, less elegant, less comprehensible -than fiction.
In fact, Niiniluoto (2002, pp. 183-184) seems to agree with this statement -and, moreover, that there is no a priori case to the contrary -in so far as simplicity is concerned (at least): 11 I suspect that Niiniluoto would find this option attractive, on the basis of the following passage:
In my view, the axiology of science should… be governed by a primary rule: try to find the complete true answer to your cognitive problem, i.e. try to reach or approach this goal.
Truthlikeness measures how close we come to this goal. As secondary rules, we may then require that our answer is justified, simple, consilient, etc. (Niiniluoto 2002, p. 174) Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 9 My response to this subtle move is to proffer another thought experiment, and elicit a judgement on the proper conduct of the scientists therein. Brace yourself again.
Imagine that all the experts in a specific area of chemistry gather together to discuss how to direct future research. They unanimously agree -and are correct (in virtue of knowing, or believing justifiably, if you so wish) -that their two best strategic options will lead to two mutually exclusive outcomes. If they take the first, they will maximize their predictive power concerning, and understanding of, the phenomena with which their branch of chemistry is concerned. If they opt for the second, they will discover the true unified theory in that domain. Their dilemma arises because their resources are limited. Pursuing all the goals simultaneously would result in extremely limited progress in achieving each. Unfortunately, moreover, pursuing the truth will result in limited incidental progress toward maximising predictive power and understanding, and vice versa.
After a heated discussion, the scientists unanimously agree that they should forego the chance to find the true theory of everything in their domain. Instead, they opt to pursue greater predictive power and understanding. Have they made the wrong decision, in some significant sense? Have they failed to do what ideal scientists would do, in such circumstances?
I contend that it is reasonable to answer these questions in the negative, even if it is assumed that the scientists have no pressing practical need to achieve greater predictive power or understanding. And note that this is not to presume that the
10
scientists take the correct course of action, in pursuing predictive power and understanding. It suffices for each option to be as good, as scientific, as the other.
12
Why do I approve of their decision, and think that it is at least as good as the alternative? Grant, for the sake of argument, that finding the truth (about the unobservable, inter alia) has considerable intrinsic value. 13 First, why deny that achieving understanding of how phenomena interrelate has similar value? I expect that Niiniluoto would not deny this, but would instead insist that truth is a necessary condition for understanding. This is suggested by the following passage (if we assume that understanding and explanation are appropriately related):
The realist of course appreciates empirical success like the empiricist… But for the realist, the truth of a theory is a precondition for the adequacy of scientific explanations. (Niiniluoto 2002, p. 167) I take Elgin (2007) to have argued convincingly that understanding is non-factive, but will not rehearse her arguments here; that would be another paper. Instead, suffice it to say that differences of opinion on this matter are crucial. For if understanding requires true theories, then the thought experiment involves an impossible scenario.
Understanding and truth would never come apart, as I contend that they can.
12 I think that the scientists did take the correct option. I shall not argue for this view here, though, since my primary target is Niiniluoto's account, and closely aligned possible accounts, of scientific progress. See Rowbottom (In Progress) for a defence of (axiological, as well as semantic)
instrumentalism.
13 I hold that the value is purely instrumental, but consider the assumption of intrinsic value to be a generous concession (to many realists) in this context. It also streamlines the discussion.
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Second, even granting that understanding is factive, why deny that achieving great predictive power has value equal to that of finding true theories (with high scope)?
14
After all, this involves acquiring a means by which to derive many truths concerning observables. And as I have already argued in the previous section, acquiring the true theory in a domain does not entail acquiring the theory that will be the most predictively useful, or indeed a theory that will be of any predictive use whatsoever, in said domain. So I will rest my case on this issue.
I take the following to be a reasonable stance. Achieving maximal verisimilitude is no more central to scientific progress than achieving maximal predictive power and understanding. Or to put it differently, the primary aspect of scientific progress should not be 'defined [purely] by increasing verisimilitude' (Niiniluoto 2014, p. 77) .
On Progressive Unjustified Scientific Beliefs
I will now move on to resisting the criticism that Niiniliuoto offers of my main argument -presented in Rowbottom 2010 -against Bird's (2007 knowledgebased view of scientific progress. This is as follows:
Rowbottom… argues that… "unjustified scientific beliefs may be progressive" by defending the semantic view by another thought experiment.
Imagine two equally advanced planets with similar theories and technologies, 14 The thought experiment can be adjusted so that it concerns only predictive power versus truth, if desired.
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one with true beliefs without justification, the other with the same beliefs but with justification…
[T]he primary application of the notion of scientific progress concerns successive theories which have been accepted by the scientific community.
Some sort of tentative justification for such theories is presupposed (even by a radical fallibilist like Popper). Irrational beliefs and beliefs without any justification simply do not belong to the scope of scientific progress. (Niiniluoto 2014, p. 76) However, it appears that Niiniluoto and I use 'justification' in different senses; I think my sense is stronger than his, and is more influenced by contemporary epistemology.
And I say this on the basis of his comment about Popper. For Popper (1983, p. 259) writes, of science:
As to its authority, or confirmation, or probability, I believe that it is nil; it is all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē. Now whereas Niiniluoto takes Popper's position to be compatible with 'some sort of tentative justification for theories' existing, most contemporary epistemologists would take the previous quotation to entail that the content of science is devoid of justification, as do I. 15 And that's because it denies that the content of science is 15 Strictly speaking, talk of 'justification of theories' should be distinguished from talk of 'justification of belief in theories'. It is important to distinguish between the content of a belief, and the believing itself, in order to understand critical rationalism. See Musgrave (1999, pp. 319-325 Popper (1959, Appendix *vii) argued that the (logical) probability of any universal hypothesis is zero relative to any finite set of observation statements. It follows -on the additional assumption that there is no way other than observation by which to raise the probability of such theories -that they never possess 'fallibilistic justification' in the above sense.
16
However, this is not to deny that scientists operate with reasons. It is, as critical rationalists say, to deny that they operate with good reasons, rather than critical 16 I could go into much more detail, and be much more precise, here -e.g., explain that the probabilities in question are not relevant if they are understood as subjective (or indeed aleatory) rather than logical in character, that statistical hypotheses will be in similar trouble when their domain is infinite, and so on -but I have already covered this elsewhere. See Rowbottom 2011a and Rowbottom 2013.
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14 reasons (at the very least, when it comes to comparing theories). 17 It might be added that to deny the presence of justification in science is not to deny the presence of: (a) the appearance of justification (qua confirmation); or (b) community methods and even (Kuhnian) disciplinary matrices. And I did not want to suggest that we imagine a scenario, on either planet, where any of these aspects of science were not present.
My presentation of the 'two planets' thought experiment treatment was also highly sensitive to which account of justification one prefers, and may be construed as comparative in character. 18 Against non-reliabilists (e.g., internalists), for example, the thought experiment may be understood such that reliable methods are nevertheless employed on the planet where justification is absent. Reliable (and stable) movement towards the truth might be made on said planet, as a result. Unfortunately, the fine details of Niiniluoto's preferred account of justification -internalist or externalist, foundationalist or coherentist, and so on -are not clear to me. So I cannot presently devise a version of the thought experiment that targets this.
17 Several of Popper's ex-students compare 'good reasons' with 'critical reasons'. See, in particular, Bartley (1984) and Miller (1994) . See also Popper (1983, pp. 19-20) :
[W]e cannot give any positive justification or any positive reason for our theories and our beliefs. That is to say, we cannot give any positive reason for holding our theories to be true…
We can often give reasons for regarding one theory as preferable to another. They consist in pointing out that, and how, one theory has hitherto withstood criticism better than another. I will call such reasons critical reasons… Giving reasons for one's preference can of course be called a justification (in ordinary language). But it is not justification in the sense criticized here.
18 Rowbottom (2010) covers several such accounts, including the one preferred by Bird (2007 Bird ( , 2008 and Williamson (2000) .
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At this juncture, I might have appealed to the experiments of Mizrahi and Buckwalter (2014) , on ordinary conceptions of scientific progress. Many subjects therein judged that progress sometimes occurs in the absence of justification (although they also judged that the addition of justification would result in more progress). And some readers may take this as evidence that progress is possible in the absence of justification. However, I believe that the results of thought experiments are theoryladen, and that experts have many shared theories about science -based on awareness of its content, social structure, and history, inter alia -that non-experts lack. Like Sorensen (2014) , I therefore hold that folk responses to philosophical thought experiments are of no more significance to philosophy than folk responses to physical thought experiments are to physics.
I will make one final point in this section. The thought experiment criticized by
Niiniluoto can be modified to involve a planet with justified scientific beliefs falling short of knowledge (e.g., due to Gettier considerations) versus a planet with scientific knowledge. I noted this in the following passage, which Niiniluoto (2014) 
On False Beliefs Promoting Progress
Briefly, in a footnote, Niiniluoto (2014, p. 76, f.9) that promote knowledge will themselves be knowledge'.)
Second, consider a false theory that is widely accepted to be true, because it has been employed repeatedly to make successful predictions. Eventually, it is used to make a false prediction. But that prediction is false only because of the assumption of, due to community belief in, initial conditions that do not obtain. The theory is then correctly classified as false, as a result. Isn't that progress promoted by a false belief? 19 If
Neptune had not been located on the basis of Le Verrier's calculations, for instance, then it might have been realized earlier than it was that Newtonian mechanics is false.
The point here rests on Duhem's thesis, that theories cannot be tested in isolation. The 19 Note that the false belief, here, might involve another theory used to calculate the initial conditions.
So here, a false belief in a theory may be directly responsible for progress.
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prediction of the orbit of Uranus, which was found to be incorrect, employed
Newton's laws of motion and gravitation, along with data on the masses and positions of the planets in the solar system. But the data on masses and positions of the planets in the solar system may not have been approximately true, in so far as Neptune was not included.
There are several other ways in which false (and not approximately true) beliefs can promote progress: belief that two theories are true or approximately so, when one is (or both are) not, may encourage scientists to conjoin the theories, and conjoining them may be useful for many predictive purposes; belief that an experiment was poorly performed, when it was not, may encourage a scientist to repeat it, and the circumstances (i.e., variables not controlled for) may change in such a way as to make the experiment give a different result, thereby promoting useful theory revisions; and so on. But I shall not overegg the pudding by providing a long list. I rest my case.
Conclusion
First, scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science's theories. Second, central aspects of scientific progress do not involve science's theories increasing in verisimilitude. Third, unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. And fourth, false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.
